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This chapter aims to explore the intersection of Christian theism, a neo-Aristotelian gloss
on metaphysical grounding, and creaturely participation in God. In section one, I aim to de-
velop several core tenets at the heart of a theistic participatory ontology as it is found in the
Christian tradition, what I call minimal participatory ontology. In section two, I examine the
contemporary notion of metaphysical grounding, namely the formal and structure features of
the grounding relation, and offer a grounding-theoretic framework for understanding a mini-
mal participatory ontology. Finally, in section three, I put forward a neo-Aristotelian account of
metaphysical grounding in particular, one that is uniquely suited to capture the central tenets of
minimal participatory ontology.
1 Minimal Participatory Ontology in the Christian Tradition
At itsmost basic level, a Christian participatory ontology pertains to the notion that all creaturely
being is received being; every aspect of non-God reality finds its ultimate source, foundation, and
proper end in the plenitudinous life of the Triune God (Rom.11:36). That individual creatures
exist at all and are what they are is, in some way or other, metaphysically derivative on God.
Of course, a fully-orbed doctrine of creaturely participation in God will include much more
besides the mere creaturely reception of being and essence from the Triune Creator. A fully-
developed Christian doctrine of creaturely participation will identify and develop the various
ways in which the Triune God is the distinctively (efficient) causal source of all creaturely reality,
as well as participatory themes throughout the wider theological and philosophical landscape
with respect to value (natural law, virtue, evil, beauty), theological anthropology (imago dei),
Christology, and soteriology (atonement, consummation, salvific and sanctifying grace, etc.), to
name a few.1
Nevertheless, getting clear on the precise ontological commitments of what I will call a “min-
imal participatory ontology” is vitally important for at least two reasons. First, it is arguably the
case thatmore fine-grained notions of soteriological participation inGod (e.g., deification, union
with or participation in Christ) are predicated upon a minimal participatory ontology, the view
that creatures derive their very existence and natures from God. While soteriological partic-
ipation in God cannot plausibly be reduced to minimal participatory ontology, it is arguably
1An excellent introduction to a participatory framework applied to a broad range of theological and philosoph-
ical areas is Davison (2019).
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founded upon it. Thus, before one builds upon a minimal participatory ontology across the var-
ious theological loci, it is important to first get clear on the minimal metaphysical commitments
of creaturely participation in God.
Second, among friends of creaturely participation in God, there has been a call for “greater
precision” regarding the metaphysics of participation.2 In section two, I aim to heed these calls
for “greater precision” regarding participatorymetaphysics by employing a neo-Aristotelian con-
ception of metaphysical grounding at play in contemporary analytic metaphysics. While much
work remains to be done concerning the various dimensions of a robust, theistic participatory
ontology, my hope is that a contemporary neo-Aristotelian framework can help elucidate and
shore up the philosophical foundations of such an idea.
What, exactly, is the minimal metaphysical content of a participatory ontology at work in the
classical Christian tradition? Towards this aim, it may be helpful to briefly rehearse what such
an ontology is not, according to classical Christian theism. First, creatures do not participate in
God by way of parthood, by becoming proper parts of the divine nature.3 From the perspective
of classical Christian theism, there is one rather obvious reason why creatures do not participate
in God by way of becoming proper parts of the divine nature. Classically understood, the divine
nature is absolutely indivisible, and thus metaphysically and mereologically simple; the divine
nature is not distributed or divided out into separable ontological bits. Thus, divine simplicity
rules out what has been called “mereological panentheism,” the view that the created order is ‘in’
God by way of being a proper part of God (or even contained in God in a more general sense).4
Second, one might appeal to divine aseity or ultimacy in order to preclude a second sense
in which creatures participate in God, by God’s being a proper part of creatures. Just as I might
participate in the activity of hand-clenching by way of the activity of one of my proper parts
(my hand), so too I might participate in God by way of the activity of one of my proper parts,
God. Against this, Thomas Aquinas (2012: 35) argued (quoting Dionysius) that “There can be
no touching Him’, i.e. God, ‘nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part.”’ In other
words, God in no way enters into the composition of any creaturely being, whether as form,
matter, or any other type of metaphysical constituent. To do so would, on Aquinas’s view, com-
promise the absolute metaphysical primacy of God as the prima causa of all creaturely reality.5
With these two mereological notions of creaturely participation in God set aside, what pos-
itive content is there to a minimal participatory ontology according to the classical Christian
tradition? For one, creaturely participation in God minimally involves the view that creatures
depend for their very existence on God; all non-God reality is in virtue of the existence and
activity of the Triune God. This minimal claim of creaturely existential dependence is richly at-
tested throughout the span of the Christian tradition, East and West alike. Here, a representative
sampling from the Christian tradition will suffice. John of Damascus (1958: 202), for instance,
underscores this aspect of creaturely participation in God when he says, “For, toward Him all
2See in particular the work of Gavrilyuk (2009).
3Where x is a proper part of y iff x is a part of y and x is not identical to y.
4This would exclude certain forms of panentheism. See Crisp (2019).
5For more on the bearing of divine simplicity on contemporary mereological metaphysics, as well as this second
line of reasoning developed in more detail, see Inman and Pruss (2019).
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things tend, and in Him they have their existence, and to all things He communicates their being
in accordance with the nature of each.”6 Moreover, in his Monologion 3, Anselm (2007: 9) argues
for the existence of a supreme nature through which all created things exist. He notes, “...[T]here
must be one thing throughwhich all existing things exist. Therefore, since all existing things exist
through that one thing, undoubtedly that one thing exists through himself. So all other existing
things exist through another; he alone exists through himself.” For Anselm, it is characteristic of
all creatures that they exist through another, in this case, through God as the sole, ultimate reality
that exists through Himself.
Not only do all creatures exist through the one supreme nature, Anselm (2007: 40) further
emphasizes inMonologion 31 the radically qualified and attenuated nature of creaturely existence
by saying that “the truth of existing is understood to be in the Word, whose essence exists so
supremely that in a certain sense it alone exists, whereas in the things that by comparison with
him in a certain sense do not exist...” In a similar manner, the Angelic Doctor (2012:451-52)
underscores in Summa Theologiae I.44.1 the derivative nature of creaturely existence as follows:
It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is
found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs
essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire...God is the essentially self-subsisting Be-
ing...Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by
participation.
In short, the existence of creatures is whollymetaphysically derivative; God, by contrast, is wholly
metaphysically underived or fundamental in His Being. We can formulate this first tenet of a
minimal participatory ontology simply as follows:
(CED) Creaturely Existential Dependence: creatures metaphysically depend on God
for their existence.
Ultimately, according to CED, the existence of all creaturely being is continuously and graciously
received from the hand of God (Rev.4:11); creaturely being per se is being by participation in or
through the supreme being.
While CED captures a crucial dimension of creaturely participation in God, it does not
exhaust the distinctive ways that creatures metaphysically participate in God according to the
Christian tradition. Traditionally, creatures not only derive their existence from God, they also
derive what they are, their natures, from God. According to minimal participatory ontology,
both the existence and content of creaturely natures are metaphysically explained, in some fash-
ion, by God. Each and every dimension of created reality is derivative on God in that the rich
plenitude of the divine nature itself provides the intelligible content of all creaturely natures.
This additional dimension of creaturely participation as it pertains to the content of creaturely
natures in particular is also amply attested in the Christian tradition. Divine exemplarism, the
idea that the divine nature itself is the exemplar or pattern after which all creaturely natures
6I owe this citation to Davison (2019: 43).
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are produced, has a longstanding precedent in the Christian tradition.7 Again, consider a few
representative examples.8 According toOrigen (1973: I.2-3), inChrist, theWisdomand eternally
begotten Word of God, “there was implicit every capacity and form of the creation that was to
be...she [Wisdom] fashions beforehand and contains within herself the species and causes of the
entire creation.”9 Likewise for Augustine (1982: 80-81), all creaturely natures are “created in
accord with reasons unique to them,” reasons that “must be thought to exist nowhere but in the
very mind of the Creator.” Indeed, Augustine goes on to underscore, “it is by participation in
these that whatever is exists in whatever manner it does.” As Andrew Davison (2019: 97-98)
points out concerning Augustine’s exemplarism, “the origin and archetypes of human beings,
or of trees or beds, or of goodness or justice, do not lie in some eternal and free-floating forms
of human beings, trees or beds, goodness or justice. According to Augustine, their origin is in
God.”10
Additionally, Anselm (2007:17), in underscoring the rationale for divine exemplarism with
respect to its connection to creation, notes that “there is no way anyone could make something
rationally unless something like a pattern (or, to put it more suitably, a form of likeness or rule) of
the thing to be made already existed in the reason of the maker.” Indeed, Anselm (2007: 40, 128)
says elsewhere that when it comes to created things that “have been made something through
him and in accordance with him, there is judged to be an imitation of that supreme essence” and
“whatever is, truly is, insofar as it is what it is in the supreme truth.” Thomas Aquinas (2012:180)
also echoes this rich divine exemplarist tradition by claiming that “In the sameway natural things
are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind.
For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the precon-
ception in the divine intellect.” While, for Aquinas, particular creaturely natures are expressions
of a mere likeness of the mode of existence those natures have in the divine nature, such natures
truly imitate or resemble the rich, qualitative plenitude of the divine nature itself. Lastly, one
can find clear articulations of divine exemplarism in a host of sixteenth and seventeenth century
Protestant divines.11 Consider one such Protestant divine, William Ames (1968: 95):
The idea of all things is the divine essence, meaning that essence understood by God
himself and imitable by his creatures–at least the image or vestige of that perfection
may be expressed in some way in creatures. That is, the creatures themselves, so
far as they are conceived in the divine mind, are the idea or image of that nature
which they have in themselves…therefore all things are first in his mind before they
7For outstanding treatments of divine exemplarism in the Christian tradition see Boland (1996), Doolan (2014),
Te Velde (1995), and Ward (2020). See Davison (2019: ch. 4) and Ward (2020: section 7) for the explicit connection
between divine exemplarism or the theory of divine ideas to a participatory ontology in particular.
8My aim in offering these samples from the Christian tradition is to merely point the reader to a longstanding
and deeply entrenched pattern in Christian reflection on the nature God and creation. I make no attempt to be
comprehensive here.
9I owe this citation to McIntosh (2012: 368).
10Davison (2019:97-98).
11The tradition of divine exemplarism spans the post-Reformation and Enlightenment periods, and extends well
into the nineteenth century. See Ames (1968:95), Muller (2017), van Mastricht (2019: 258), Crisp (2020), and
Bavinck (2004: 206), respectively.
4
are in themselves. In us the things themselves are the pattern and our knowledge is
the image of them. But in God the divine knowledge is the pattern and the things
themselves are the image or express likeness of it.
Consequently, given the centrality of the notion that God is the exemplar or pattern for all crea-
turely natures in the Christian tradition, we can add the following additional tenet to minimal
participatory ontology:
(CND) Creaturely Nature Dependence: creatures metaphysically depend on God for
their natures.
With respect to both CED and CND, then, God is the ultimate metaphysical fount of created be-
ing and essence; all chains of creaturely existential and essential dependence ultimately terminate
in the triune God.
A minimal participatory ontology consisting of CED and CND arguably gives rise to the
following additional tenet of minimal participatory ontology regarding God’s metaphysical ulti-
macy and priority to all created reality:
(DF) Divine Fundamentality: God is absolutely fundamental and metaphysically
prior to all created reality.
To say that God is absolutely fundamental in this sense is to say that God is the ultimate ontolog-
ical terminus for all chains of creaturely existential and essential dependence. Ultimately, both
the existence of the creaturely order itself, as well as its diverse qualitative essential structure
obtain in virtue of the nature and activity of God. As such, the kind of metaphysical depen-
dence relation operative in CED, CND, and DF is asymmetric in that it carves out a distinctive
metaphysical ordering relation between creatures and God; God alone exists and is what God
is in an unparticipated manner, we might say. As metaphysically fundamental in every way,
God is metaphysically prior to creatures; as metaphysically derivative in every way, creatures are
metaphysically posterior to God.
Lastly, it is important to identify several theistic explanatory theses that follow quite naturally
from the conjunction of CED, CND, and DF, theses that could be included either as an essential
tenet of minimal participatory ontology, or perhaps as a natural corollary to it.12 Note that all
three tenets of a minimal participatory ontology (CED, CND, and DF) carve out the necessary
metaphysical structure needed to back metaphysical explanations concerning why creatures ul-
timately exist and are what they are, explanations that ultimately terminate in facts about the
existence, nature, and activity of God.13
Intuitively, metaphysical explanation holds between at least two propositions or facts and
is thought to be a non-causal variety of explanation; arguably, not all ontological explanatory
12If one thinks that facts are the primary (perhaps sole) relata of the grounding relation, then the explanatory
theses to follow will play a more central role in outlining a minimal participatory ontology. On my own view, as
facts are less fundamental than their constituent entities, it is the grounding relations that hold between entities that
determine which facts obtain.
13That is, assuming what Jaegwon Kim (1988) has called “explanatory realism”, the view that explanations track
objective dependence relations in the world.
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structure in reality is carved out by (efficient) causal relations. Some fact F, say the apple’s ex-
emplifying a redness trope or the universal redness, metaphysically explains some fact G, say the
apple’s being red, only if G obtains because of F and not vice versa, where the sense of ‘because’
here is commonly believed to track something deeper than an (efficient) causal explanatory re-
lation (though it may share similarities with such a notion).14
If all creaturely dimensions of reality are ontologically dependent on God along the lines of
CED, CND, and DF, it is a natural step to think that all metaphysical explanations concerning
facts about creaturely existence and the content of creaturely natures also terminate in theistic
facts about God. Call an “existence-fact” ([x]) a fact pertaining to the existence of a creature x,
and an “essential-fact” ([□x]) a fact concerning the nature or essence of x. We have, then, the
following expansive, theistic explanatory thesis:
(TEB) Theistic Explanatory Breadth: Necessarily, for any creature x, and for any [x]
and [□x] that obtains, there is some theistic fact (or set of facts) [G] that obtains
such that the obtaining of [G] metaphysically explains the obtaining of [x] and the
obtaining of [□x].
As a thesis about the order of metaphysical explanation between facts about God and facts about
creaturely existence and creaturely natures, TEB fits quite naturally within a minimal participa-
tory ontology that includes objective, metaphysical ordering relations between God and crea-
tures along the lines of CED, CND, and DF. If asymmetric relations of metaphysical depen-
dence hold between creatures and God, and God is metaphysically prior to creatures (and not
vice versa), then such structure plausibly supports metaphysical explanatory relations between
God and creatures as well; facts concerning the existence and natures of creatures are explained
in terms of facts about God, whether facts about His nature or activity (or some combination
thereof). For instance, the fact that tigers and tulips exist and have the biological natures they
do (including the diverse, qualitative content of those natures) is explained by some fact or facts
about God.
Since all creaturely beings and natures are derivative on God according to CED and CND,
theistic facts about God’s nature and activity serve to metaphysically explain the existence and
qualitative nature of each creature. Wemight even go so far as to say that on a robust theistic par-
ticipatory ontology, perhaps all “explanation-eligible”15 facts about creatures are metaphysically
explained by facts about God; there are no non-divine facts that fall outside of the explanatory
scope of the existence, nature, and activity of the Triune God (Rom. 11:36).
To be clear, TEB is a thesis about explanatory scope, not explanatory completeness.16 The
aforementioned claim at the heart of TEB is that among the explanatory grounds for why some
creaturely fact obtains will be some theistic fact or set of theistic facts. As far as I can tell, TEB
in no way rules out the additional claim that some creaturely facts are also explained by other
14For those who gloss metaphysical grounding or explanation in terms similar to causation, i.e., “metaphysical
causation”, see Schaffer (2016) and Wilson (2018).
15I owe this fine phrase to Murphy (2011:62).
16This distinction is helpfully emphasized by Murphy (2011:62).
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creaturely facts. For example, one might think that among the explanatory grounds for the ob-
taining of facts concerning free creaturely actions are also facts about the existence and activity
of free agents.17 Thus, the theistic explanatory thesis in question does not entail that facts about
God are the sole explanatory grounds for each and every creaturely fact.18
We can supplement TEB, as a thesis concerning explanatory scope, with a thesis of theis-
tic explanatory immediacy that also fits well within a minimal participatory ontology: the way
in which theistic facts metaphysically explain all existence-facts and essential-facts concerning
creatures is in no way mediated. More specifically, we can supplement TEB above to generate
the following:
(TEI) Theistic Explanatory Immediacy: Necessarily, for any creature x, and for any
[x] and [□x] that obtains, there is some theistic fact (or set of facts) [G] that obtains
such that the obtaining of [G] metaphysically explains the obtaining of [x] and the
obtaining of [□x], and there is no creaturely fact or set of facts [S] (not including [x]
or [□x]) that obtains such that God metaphysically explains [x] or [□x] by way of
metaphysically explaining the obtaining of [S].
On TEI, for each and every existence and essential fact about creatures that obtains, God is im-
mediately explanatorily relevant to its obtaining. TEI helps ground the notion that God plays
an up-front, non-instrumental ontological role in explaining facts concerning the existence and
qualitative natures of creatures. Kathryn Tanner (1988:84), in the spirit of both TEB and TEI,
puts this emphatically as follows, “[E]verything non-divine must be talked about as existing in a
relation of total and immediate dependence upon God.”19
2 Metaphysical Grounding andMinimal Participatory Ontology
We have thus far seen how a minimal participatory ontology can be stated in terms of relations
of existential and essential metaphysical dependence (CED, CND, and DF), as well as two meta-
physical explanatory theses backed by these relations (TEB and TEI). I now want to aim to show
how a contemporary, neo-Aristotelian account of the nature of metaphysical grounding in par-
ticular can help support each of these ontological claims at the heart of a minimal participatory
ontology.
In recent years, the notion ofmetaphysical grounding has received renewed attention by ana-
lytic metaphysicians and considered by many to be a helpful piece of metaphysical machinery. It
has been argued that an appeal to grounding as a form of non-causal, metaphysical dependence
improves our understanding of truthmaking (Schaffer 2009; Lowe 2009b, Inman 2012), physi-
calism (Schaffer 2009; Loewer 2001: 39), intrinsicality (Witmer et al. 2005), objective similarity
17For more on the claim that both God and creatures provide dual, non-competitive metaphysical explanations
for certain facts regarding creaturely action, see Davison (2019: ch. 9), Grant (2019), and Koons (2002).
18This, perhaps, is enough to safeguard against the charge of occasionalism. See Grant (2019).
19For a defense of something similar to TEI see Philip Quinn (1988:87,98). I owe these citations to Robert Garcia
(2015: 114).
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(Sider 2012), perfectly natural properties (Schaffer 2004), the nature of non-causal explanation
(Audi 2012), trope inherence (Lowe 2006), and an overall realist approach to metaphysics (Fine
2001; Schaffer 2009).
As a result, grounding has been hailed as a unified and theoretically fruitful notion that un-
dergirds a variety of concepts in metaphysics. As the literature on metaphysical grounding is
expansive, ever-expanding, and fraught with disagreement, it is beyond the scope of this chapter
to argue for the specific account of metaphysical grounding I offer below. Rather, my aim is to
unpack a neo-Aristotelian view of grounding that can be put to use in illuminating the minimal
participatory ontology outlined in section 1.
2.1 The Nature of Metaphysical Grounding
In the broadest sense, I am inclined to think that the relation of “metaphysical grounding” picks
out a general type of structure-making relation, one that serves to carve out the distinctively
metaphysical structure of reality. Along these lines, I adopt a version of what is known as ground-
ing monism, the view that there is a single, fundamental grounding relation.20 Following Bradley
Rettler (2017:13-14), this single, fundamental grounding relation, call it Grounding for short,
is essentially defined by its structure-making role of carving out the distinctively metaphysical
(non-causal) structure of reality. According to Rettler (2017: 13-14), Grounding “relates the
fundamental to the non-fundamental, relates the relatively more fundamental to the relatively
less fundamental, lays out the structure of the world, says which things depend on which other
things, explains why something exists, and explains why something has a property.”21
As such, Grounding is a specification relation that admits of various species (or determi-
nates); there are plausibly many ways of being Grounded. Relations such as ontological depen-
dence, truthmaking, and metaphysical explanation are all plausibly considered to be structure-
making relations that carve out the metaphysical structure of reality. What unifies each of the
above relations and makes them all species of Grounding is that each is characterized by its role
of carving out metaphysical structure in some way. As Rettler (2017:12) puts it,
The essence of truthmaking is that it’s the grounding of a thing’s truth in an object.
The essence of metaphysical explanation is that it’s the grounding of a thing’s truth
in other, usually more fundamental, truths. The essence of ontological dependence
is that it’s the grounding of a thing’s existence in another thing’s existence.
Consequently, “grounding” is multivocal in that it picks out different species of Grounding in
different contexts, whether ontological dependence, truthmaking, or metaphysical explanation.
20See Fine (2012).
21Bennett (2017) takes a genus-species approach to what she calls “building relations”. This view also has prece-
dent in Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015). Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015: 519) notes, “Grounding is the non-causal generic
relation of being F in virtue of (or, equivalently, the generic relation of being F non-causally in virtue of ) Thus a rela-
tion is a case or species of grounding if it is a specification of the non-causal generic relation of being F in virtue of.
Therefore, truthmaking is a case or species of grounding since it is the non-causal relation of being true in virtue of :
the proposition <Socrates is white> is true in virtue of the fact that Socrates is white. Similarly, being right in virtue
of, being blue in virtue of, existing in virtue of, and many other such relations are also cases or species of grounding.”
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If “grounding” is multivocal in this way it is important to specify which particular species
of Grounding one has in view when it comes to explicating a minimal participatory ontology in
ground-theoretic terms. As we have seen in section 1, CED and CND together carve out several
deep metaphysical dependence relations that hold between creatures and God. Consequently,
as a particular species of Grounding that holds between entities in particular, the relation of
ontological dependence seems to nicely fit the bill when it comes to explicating CED and CND
within a contemporary grounding-theoretic framework.
Moreover, in section 1 we outlined two explanatory theses, TEB and TEI, that are founded
upon CED and CND and are perhaps corollaries of a minimal participatory ontology. Since TEB
and TEI are distinctively explanatory theses about creaturely facts (truths or states of affairs) and
their relation to facts about God, it is natural to think that the species of Grounding involved here
is that of metaphysical explanation. Accordingly, the created order is metaphysically grounded
in God along the lines of TEB and TEI in the sense that facts about the existential and essential
structure of the created order immediately obtain in virtue of theistic facts, and not vice versa.
Along these lines, God is explanatorily ultimate in that the class of absolutely fundamental facts
or truths are coextensive with theistic facts; there are no non-theistic facts that are absolutely,
metaphysically fundamental or ungrounded.22
Bymy lights, a comprehensive account of aminimal participatory ontology in ground-theoretic
terms should invoke both species of Grounding, ontological dependence and metaphysical ex-
planation. But, formy limited purposes here, I’ll aim to unpack aminimal participatory ontology
within a grounding framework exclusively in terms of ontological dependence. Thus, I speak of
“metaphysical grounding” in what follows, I mean to pick out the relation of ontological depen-
dence whose relata are entities, broadly construed.
2.2 The Structure of Metaphysical Grounding
According to our minimal participatory ontology outlined in section one, creaturely beings ex-
ist (CED) and are what they are (CND) ultimately in virtue of the existence, nature, and/or the
activity of the Triune God.23 That creatures exist at all, which creatures exist, and what individ-
ual creatures are fundamentally is metaphysically grounded in God. Moreover, creaturely beings
and the content of their creaturely natures are metaphysical grounded in God, and not vice versa;
God is the ultimate metaphysical ground of all non-God reality, according to DF. In offering a
grounding-theoretic framework as a helpful guide to unpacking a minimal participatory ontol-
ogy, it is absolutely vital to identify a particular species of metaphysical grounding that supports
this crucial ontological asymmetry between God and creatures.24 As we will see in section three,
22Of course, one might take one particular species or determinate of Grounding to be more fundamental than
another, say grounding relations between facts or truths as more fundamental than grounding relations between
entities.
23Additionally, all facts pertaining to the existence, nature, and activity of creatures is in some way grounded in
the being, nature, and activity of facts about God and his causal activity. I will leave aside this aspect of creaturely
participation in God at the level of facts.
24Davison (2019:148) helpfully unpacks this asymmetry in the context of what I am calling Creaturely Nature
Dependence: “Here, we can also usefully note that the relation between exemplar and likeness runs differently in
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not all varieties of this particular species of grounding (again, understood in terms of ontological
dependence) support the needed asymmetry for creaturely participation in God.
What might we say about the general formal structure of the type of metaphysical grounding
needed to support a minimal participatory ontology along the lines of CED, CND, and DF? To
start, I take the domain of entities that can be relata of the grounding relation in this context
to be maximally general; entities of any ontological category are able to stand in metaphysical
grounding relations:
G1: Topic Neutrality: entities of any ontological category can serve as the relata of
grounding.
Intuitively, created beings of diverse ontological categories such as substances (living organisms),
events (baseball games), kinds (horseness), modes (redness), and relations (taller than) are po-
tential relata of the grounding relation.
Moreover, in light of the topic-neutrality of grounding as per G1, the logical form of ground-
ing in this context is best expressed by a two-place predicate “x ▷ y” (which stands for “x is
grounded in y”):
x▷ y = x is grounded in y
As noted above, grounding is thought to be a type of structure-making relation that carves
out (in various ways) the metaphysical structure of reality. Thus, it is plausibly construed as
a metaphysical ordering relation that generates a strict partial order over a domain of entities.
More precisely,
G2. Irreflexive: ¬(x▷ x)
G3. Asymmetric: (y ▷ x) → ¬(x▷ y)
G4. Transitive: (y ▷ x ∧ z ▷ y) → (z ▷ x)
G2-G4 are formal features of metaphysical grounding that are vital for preserving the core tenets
of minimal participatory ontology, in particular, God’s ultimate metaphysical priority with re-
spect to creaturely reality. However, as we will see shortly, arguably not all varieties of this partic-
ular species of grounding carve out strict partial ordering relations. Suffice it to say at this point
that in order for metaphysical grounding to help elucidate a minimal participatory ontology it is
important to preserve grounding as a partial-ordering relation in terms of G2-G4.
Metaphysical grounding can also be either total or partial. To briefly illustrate the difference
between total and partial grounding, consider a rather common analysis of the nature of events
in terms of the triple [o, P, t], where ‘o’ stands for some object or objects, ‘P ’ a property (whether
monadic or polyadic), and ‘t’ a time. On this account of events, the event [o, P, t] exists just in
tis two directions. It is asymmetrical. We say that the image is like the exemplar, which is what likeness means. We
only perversely say that the exemplar is like the image: my portrait is like me; I am not ‘like my portrait’. The world
bears some of God’s likeness but God is not like the world, not least since the act of creation is constitutive of the
creature, but not to the creator.”
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case o has P at t. The total grounds for the event of the the collision of the Titanic with the iceberg
on April 14, 1912, for example, include the objects of the Titanic and the iceberg, the dyadic
relation colliding with, and the particular time of April 14, 1912. The event is totally grounded in
the items that are among its constituents in the sense that no additional creaturely being needs
to be added to these three items to fully explain what grounds the event in question. Partial
grounding, by contrast, is often defined in terms of total grounding in that while some item, say
o, does not fully ground [o, P, t] on its own, o, together with other entities (in this case P and t)
provide full grounds for the triple [o, P, t]. In this way, as a partial ground, o contributes to (but
does not exhaust) the grounds of [o, P, t].
Bymy lights, a commitment tominimal participatory ontology along the lines of CED, CND,
and DF (together with the auxiliary explanatory theses of TEB and TEI), lends credence to the
following claim about God’s being at least a partial ground for the existence and nature of any
creaturely being:
(TPG) Theistic Partial Grounding: For any existing entity x that is not identical to
God, x is partially grounded in God.
TPG affirms that God is, at the very least, among the metaphysical grounds for any being that is
not-God. Of course, God, as universal primary cause, will be the principal ground among the
partial grounds of x.25
Whether one opts for TPG or the much stronger thesis that God is the total ground for the
existence and nature of any creaturely being, will largely depend on one’s wider metaphysical
and theological commitments. For instance, if one goes for the stronger claim that every being
that is not identical to God is totally grounded in God, then this would seem to preclude the
view that any creature, understood in the broad sense as any existing entity that is not identical
to God, has another creature among its total or partial grounds. Consequently, on this stronger
view, there would be no creature-to-creature grounding relations. This would seem to preclude
the idea that creaturely agents are at least among the partial grounds for the existence and expla-
nation of events brought about by free creaturely acts of will. But if there are creature-to-creature
grounding relations and creatures can serve as the partial grounds for other creatures (as seems
plausible), then TPG preserves this possibility while ascribing God metaphysical pride of place
as the chief partial ground of every creaturely being; every creaturely being has, at at bottom, a
theistic ground.26
25See Kenneth Pearce (2017) for an interesting grounding proposal that God is the “foundational ground” for the
entire sequence of causal events he calls “History”. Pearce contends that primary causation in this sense is not a causal
relation at all (except perhaps analogically). In a similar vein, Caleb Cohoe (2013: n. 4) remarks, “Aquinas’s account
of causality is therefore closer to contemporary theories of ontological dependence than it is to the predominant
contemporary theories of causality.”
26TPG, as well as minimal participatory ontology in general, can also serve to provide the ontological scaffold-
ing for a theistic metaethical theory that accounts for creaturely goodness (and perhaps the convertibility of being
and goodness) in the fact that all creaturely existence and essence is metaphysically grounded in God. As Mark
Murphy (2011:165-66) points out along these lines, “For on this concurrentist view, all created goodness is merely
a participation in, a resemblance to, God’s goodness. One cannot properly contrast the love appropriately given
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In addition to being total or partial, I consider grounding to be both an existence entailing
relation and one that holds of necessity. Taking ‘E’ as the existence predicate,27 grounding is:
G5. Existence Entailing: □(x▷ y → (Ex ∧ Ey))
as well as a relation that obtains of necessity (if it obtains at all):
G6. Necessity: (x▷ y → □(Ex → x▷ y))
G5 states that necessarily, if x is grounded in y then both x and y exist. If creatures aremetaphys-
ically grounded in God, then both God and creatures exist. Regarding G6, if x is grounded in y,
then it is necessarily the case that if x exists, then x is grounded in y. G6 tracks the intuition that
an entity’s depending on another entity for its existence is a non-contingent feature of that entity.
The very concept of creatureliness, we might say, essentially involves the notion of received or
participated being, both the existence and the natures of creatures are metaphysically derivative
on God. On G6, if the existence and nature of Fido the dog is metaphysically grounded in God,
then it is necessarily the case that if Fido exists, then Fido is grounded in God in such a way.
Let us now turn to the question of the well-foundedness of grounding, which has immedi-
ate bearing on our proposed grounding-account of a minimal participatory ontology. We first
need to get clear on the relationship between grounding and metaphysical fundamentality. For
our purposes here, it will be important to distinguish between the notions of relative and abso-
lute fundamentality. Something, x, is relatively fundamental to y just in case x grounds y, and
not vice versa. In this case, since x grounds y, x is more metaphysically fundamental than y;
likewise, since y is grounded in x, y is less metaphysically fundamental than x. The notion of
relative fundamentality carves out a hierarchically (asymmetrically) ordered conception of real-
ity where some beings are more or less metaphysically fundamental than others. In general, the
notion of metaphysical fundamentality should march in step with the direction of metaphysical
grounding. With this notion of relative fundamentality in hand, we can go on to define absolute
fundamentality such that, x, is absolutely fundamental if and only if there is nothing distinct
from x, y, such that y is relatively fundamental to x. Absolutely fundamental beings are those
that are metaphysically ungrounded, full stop.
Now, to say that grounding is well-founded is to say that for any non-empty grounding do-
main D there must be at least one metaphysically ungrounded entity in D.28 To unpack this idea,
call a minimal element, e, of a non-empty grounding domain D one such that there is no y in D
such that e is grounded in y. A minimal element of D is one that is not grounded by anything
else in D; e is absolutely metaphysically fundamental and foundational with respect to D. With
to God and the love appropriately given to created goods if the goodness of created goods is thus derivative of the
divine goodness; all love of created goods is, in a way, a love of the divine goodness. This does not entail horrifying
instrumentalization or nihilism with respect to created goods...it does, rather, acknowledge that created goods have
their goodness through another.”
27Where ”Ex” is defined as (∃y)(x = y).
28Where a grounding domain D is non-empty just in case there are at least two existing entities in D (as per G2
and G5) that stand in the grounding relation with respect to one another (remaining neutral as to which grounds
which).
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this notion of a minimal element for a domain in hand, we can state the well-foundedness of
grounding as follows:
G7: Well-Foundedness: for any non-empty grounding domain D there is, of neces-
sity, at least one minimal element in D.
G7 is the metaphysical analogue of the axiom of foundation in set theory, that every non-empty
set contains a minimal element (as a member), as well as the metaphysical analogue of founda-
tionalism in epistemology, that every chain of epistemic justification terminates in a set of basic
beliefs that are non-inferentially justified. The denial of G7 amounts to the possibility that the
exhaustive inventory of reality consists entirely of grounded entities: its just one grounded thing
after another such that a exists in virtue of b, b exists in virtue of c, c in virtue of d, and so on
ad infinitum. On the denial of G7, there is no minimal grounding element and thus no ultimate
metaphysical foundation or bedrock to D. By my lights, a minimal participatory ontology entails
the metaphysical impossibility of what Bohn (2018:8) calls “infinite descent” in this context, the
view that “it is possible that there is no fundamental ground at all.”29
Of course, G7 is directly relevant to a core tenet of minimal participatory ontology, that God
is absolutely metaphysically fundamental and prior to all created reality (DF).30 How might we
think about DF in ground-theoretic terms along the lines of G7? Suppose we consider the max-
imally inclusive grounding domain, DI , to include not only the creature-to-creature grounding
relations that obtain but also the (asymmetric) grounding relations that obtain between God and
creatures. We can then formulate DF in ground-theoretic terms along the lines of G7 as follows:
God is the minimal element of the most inclusive grounding domain, DI . God is the absolute
metaphysical foundation of and metaphysically prior to all non-God reality; God alone is the
sole (absolutely) ungrounded reality.
In addition to the above theistic reason for affirming G7 as part and parcel of a ground-
theoretic account of a minimal participatory ontology, there are additional theoretical reasons
why one might endorse G7 as a constraint on metaphysical grounding. Many metaphysicians
who feel the pull of G7 justify their acceptance of it on the basis of its naturalness or intuitive-
ness; G7 strikes them as a reasonable thesis that, in the absence of overriding considerations to
the contrary, is more plausible than its denial.31 Some proponents of G7 take its underlying mo-
tivation to be that if there were no lower-bound to the grounding domain of reality, then nothing
would exist in reality. Leibniz, for instance, in his June 30, 1704 letter to de Volder stated thus:
“Where there is no reality that is not borrowed, there will never be any reality, since it must
belong ultimately to some subject.”32
Jonathan Schaffer (2010: 62) shares the Leibnizian intuition in that “endless dependence con-
flicts with the foundationalist requirement that there be basic objects...Being would be infinitely
29In contrast to Bohn (2018:8) who employs the possibility of infinite descent as a potential defeater to the ne-
cessity of what he calls “(strong) divine foundationalism” (the view that “anything distinct from God is existentially
grounded by God”), I employ the (conditional) necessity of DF as evidence against the possibility of infinite descent.
30In fact, several recent versions of the cosmological argument, as in the work of Deng (2020) and Pearce (2017),
have appealed explicitly to God as metaphysically foundational in this sense akin principle akin G7.
31See Fine (1991: 267).
32Quoted in Adams (1994: 335).
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deferred, never achieved.” Others simply report their inability to comprehend the denial of G7.
On this score, Lowe (1998: 158) candidly states “all real existence must be ‘grounded’ or ‘well-
founded’. Such an ‘axiom of foundation’ is quite probably beyond conclusive proof and yet I find
the vertiginous implications of its denial barely comprehensible.”
Wholly apart from a commitment to a minimal participatory ontology, then, one can argue
that accepting G7 has a certain theoretical utility in that it offers a unified explanatory ground
for the existence of each grounded entity in a domain.33 In a domain deprived of a minimal ele-
ment, the existence of each grounded entity is explained in terms of a distinct (albeit immediate)
ground or collection of grounds, which are themselves grounded entities. Accepting the well-
foundedness of grounding, on the other hand, allows the ungrounded entity to serve as one and
the same explanation for the existence of each grounded entity in that domain. This preserves
the theoretical principle that it is better to have a single explanatory ground for each phenomena
(the phenomena here is the existence of each individual grounded entity) than to have a distinct
explanatory ground for each phenomena.
Evenmore, positing at least one ungrounded entity in a grounding domain lends an explana-
tion for not only the existence of each grounded entity in that domain, but also for the existence
of grounded entities per se in that domain. It is one thing for there to be an explanation for the
existence of each grounded entity in a domain, quite another for there to be an explanation for
why the class of grounded entities exist in that domain in the first place.34 Accepting G7 affords
both theoretical simplicity as well as explanatory power with respect to the existence of grounded
entities. Of course, such theoretical simplicity and explanatory power provide independent, the-
oretical warrant for the core tenets of a minimal participatory ontology (CED and CND) and its
natural corollaries (TEB and TEI).
3 Neo-Aristotelian Grounding for Creaturely Participation
We have been concerned up to this point with getting clear on the formal and structural features
of a particular species of Grounding, viz. ontological dependence, and how exactly it relates
to minimal participatory ontology. However, it is important to point out that ontological de-
pendence, as a particular species of Grounding, is also a genus that itself admits of a variety of
different species, not all of which are equally suited to secure CED, CND, and DF as core tenets
of minimal participatory ontology. And since our immediate context in this chapter is the claim
that creatures participate inGod byway of both their existence and natures being asymmetrically
grounded in God, it is important to identify a particular species of metaphysical grounding that
fits the bill in question.35 What we are looking for, then, is a species of metaphysical ground-
ing that is both fine-grained enough to account for both existential and essential dependence of
33See Cameron (2008) for instance.
34See Pearce (2017) for further argumentation on this point.
35My discussion of the varieties of metaphysical grounding follows closely the work of Lowe and Tahko (2015).
See Koslicki (2013) for an excellent overview of the varieties of ontological dependence in the neo-Aristotelian
literature.
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creatures on God (CED and CND), as well as one that supports the metaphysical priority of God
with respect to creatures, thus securing the crucial asymmetry betweenGod and creaturely being
at the heart of a theistic participatory ontology. By my lights, only a neo-Aristotelian account of
grounding is suited for the task.
3.1 Modal-Existential Grounding
It is commonplace in contemporary metaphysics to find ordinary grounding claims such as “or-
dinary composite objects are grounded in their proper parts” and “tropes are grounded in their
bearers”. These ordinary grounding claims naturally give expression to the idea that, at the very
least, the existence of the one is grounded in the existence of the other(s). Ordinary compos-
ite objects exist in virtue of the existence and structure of their proper parts; or particularized
properties or tropes exist in virtue of the existence of their bearers. These grounding claims
are very often explicated in modal-existential terms such that it is metaphysically necessary that
composite objects (or tropes) exist only if their proper parts (or bearers) exist.
One common way of formulating this variety of existential grounding is in the following
modal terms:36
(RG) x is rigidly existentially grounded in y =def □(Ex → Ey)
As a rigid form of existential grounding, RG captures the insight that one thing (x) may depend
on another specific entity (y) for its existence: it is metaphysically impossible for x to exist unless
y—that very entity—exists.
It would seem that RG naturally fits the bill when it comes to elucidating CED as a core tenet
of minimal participatory ontology, the claim that creatures metaphysically depend on a specific
entity for their existence, namely God. Surely, it is metaphysically impossible for creatures to
exist unless God Himself existed. Yet, there are several good reasons for thinking that RG fails
to adequately account for the species of grounding at work in a minimal participatory ontology.
First, recall that creaturely participation in God is asymmetric, creatures exist and are what
they are in virtue of God, not vice versa. Yet, there are plausible instances of RG that are symmet-
ric.37 If so, then x’s being rigidly existentially grounded in y doesn’t guarantee that y fails to be
rigidly existentially grounded in x, which would be needed in order to secure the claim that y is
more fundamental than x.
Consider the following examples of mutual or symmetric existential grounding along the
lines of RG. On one particular brand of trope-bundle theory defended by Peter Simons (1994),
objects consist of a two-tiered bundle of tropes. On the one hand, the essential features of an
object are determined by a particular bundle of mutually dependent tropes (what Simons calls
the “nucleus”), while the non-essential features are determined by a further bundle of tropes
that inhere in the nucleus. Or consider the grounding relations that obtain between Socrates
and his biological life, taken as a temporally extended event. Arguably, the existence of Socrates’
36As per section 2.2, here I use the sentential operator ‘E’ for the existence predicate and define it in terms of the
existential quantifier: Ex =def (∃y)(x = y)
37See Barnes (2018) and Thompson (2016).
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life is rigidly existentially grounded in Socrates (necessarily, it exists only if Socrates exists), and
Socrates is rigidly existentially grounded in his biological life (necessarily, he exists only if his
life exists). Consequently, it would seem that RG is unable to secure the asymmetry of creaturely
existential dependence on God as per CED.
A second, more fatal worry is that RG, as a purely modal-existential species of grounding, is
ill-suited to capture an integral dimension of creaturely participation in God, namely, the essen-
tial dependence of creatures on God along the lines of CND. Recall that minimal participatory
ontology consists of the view that creaturely natures are patterned after God along the lines of
divine exemplarism; both the existence and the content of creaturely essences are metaphysically
grounded in God.
However, following the contemporary influential work of Kit Fine (1994, 1995) and other
neo-Aristotelian-minded philosophers, the essence or nature of a thing is arguably not reducible
to what is modally required for its existence. In other words, what is true of a creature in every
possible world in which it exists does not adequately capture its essence, what it is fundamentally.
If so, then a purely modal-existential account of grounding along the lines of RG will not suffice
to adequately capture the way in which the essences of creatures are grounded in God.
While a neo-Aristotelian defense of the irreducibility of essence to modality is well-beyond
the scope of this chapter, let me offer one Finean counterexample to a purely modal account of
essence.38 While modal requirement for existence may be necessary for a thing’s essence (after
all, how could a creature be essentially F if it didn’t have F in every possible world in which it
exists?), it is not sufficient to adequately capture what a particular creature is fundamentally.
Consider Fine’s (1994) now well-known counterexample involving Socrates (s) and his sin-
gleton set {Socrates}, the set whose sole member is Socrates. On standard modal set theory,
necessarily, if Socrates exists then he is a member of his singleton set:
(a) □(Es → s ∈ {Socrates})
If modal requirement for existence were both necessary and sufficient to capture the essence of
Socrates, then (a) would be equivalent to the following essentialist thesis, where “□s” is to be
read as the essentialist operator “it is part of the essence of s that:”
(b) □s(s ∈ {Socrates})
But, argues Fine and others, (b) seems deeply implausible. It is difficult to see how Socrates’s
essence,what Socrates is fundamentally, involves reference to any set-theoretic entitywhatsoever.
As Fine (1994) puts it, “There is nothing in the nature of a person, if I may put it this way, which
demands that he belongs to this or that set or which demands, given that the person exists, that
there even be any sets.”
More precisely, the worry here is that there is an importantmodal symmetry between Socrates
and his singleton across possible worlds where Socrates exists; necessarily, if Socrates exists
then his singleton exists (and vice versa). Yet, there is arguably an essential asymmetry between
Socrates and his singleton regarding their fundamental nature or identity; while the essence of
38For further detail see Fine (1994), Oderberg (2007), and my (2018).
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{Socrates} is what it is in virtue of Socrates, the essence of Socrates is not what it is in virtue
of his singleton, {Socrates}. What {Socrates} is fundamentally seems wholly irrelevant to what
Socrates is fundamentally. Thus, to reduce what a creature is fundamentally to what is true of a
creature in every possible world in which it exists is wholly inadequate. In the place of a purely
modal account of essence, Fine recommends a primitive, non-modal account of essence that is
best unpacked in terms of the more traditional notion of Aristotelian real definition.
3.2 Essential-Existential Grounding
If RG is ill-suited to account for the core tenets of minimal participatory ontology, CED and
CND in particular, what might we offer in its place? I’m inclined to think that it is only if we take
the neo-Aristotelian turn and opt for a non-modal or essentialist notion of existential grounding
that we can adequately make progress in our attempt to formulate a ground-theoretic framework
of a minimal participatory ontology in terms of CED, CND, and DF.
With the notion of essence as primitive, we can formulate the following non-modal species
of existential grounding, call it “essentialE grounding”:
(REG) x is rigidly essentiallyE grounded in y =def □x(Ex → Ey)
REG states x is rigidly essentiallyE grounded in y if and only if it is part of the essence of x such
that if x exists, then y exists. In important ways, REG improves onRG as a species ofmetaphysical
grounding that aims to capture the notion of creaturely participation in God along the lines of
CED and CND. For one, it is crucial to note that REG is more fine-grained than RG precisely
because it entails (but is not entailed by) its respective modal counterpart (RG); that is, while
every case of rigid essentialE grounding is a case of rigid existential grounding, the converse does
not hold. More specifically, if it is part of the nature or essence of Socrates’ singleton that it exist
only if Socrates exists (REG), then it is necessary that if Socrates’ singleton exists then Socrates
exists (RG). In general, since the essence or real definition of a singleton set involves reference to
the existence of its sole member, the existence of the singleton both essentially and existentially
necessitates the existence of its sole member.
Likewise, as a non-modal species of grounding, REG does not entail that the essence of the
ground is wholly irrelevant to the existence of that which is grounded. Recall that according to
RG, since it is necessarily the case that in every world in which Socrates exists his singleton exists,
Socrates is rigidly existentially grounded in his singleton; Socrates, the grounded, necessitates
the existence of his singleton, the ground. Yet intuitively, as we noted above, the existence of a
set-theoretic entity seems wholly irrelevant to whether or not Socrates exists.
In contrast to RG, the neo-Aristotelian move to REG has no such implication. According to
REG, from the fact that it is necessarily the case that in every world in which Socrates exists his
singleton exists, it does not follow that Socrates is rigidly essentiallyE grounded in his singleton; it
is no part of the essence of Socrates that he exists only if such a set-theoretic entity exists. Again,
the relevant grounding ordering intuitively runs from Socrates to Socrates’ singleton, not the
other way around. Similarly, from the fact that it is necessarily the case that in every world in
which Socrates exists the temporal event that is his life exists, it does not follow that therefore
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Socrates is rigidly essentiallyE grounded in his life; arguably the event exists and is what it is (and
which particular event it is) in virtue of Socrates, not the other way around. In so far as REG
entails but is not entailed by RG, it rightly models the order of grounding as Socrates is arguably
more fundamental than either his singleton or the temporally extended event that is his life.
There is, however, reason to think that even the above non-modal species of grounding in
terms of REG is neither fine-grained enough nor suited to support all three core tenets of a min-
imal participatory ontology (CED, CND, DF). First, some have argued that there are plausi-
ble cases of essentialE grounding that are symmetric, and that arguably all forms of existential
grounding, whethermodal or non-modal, are best characterized as non-symmetric. For instance,
on certain (realist) structuralist mathematical ontologies that explicate numbers as nodes in a
structural network, it is part of the essence of each number that it exists in virtue of the other
nodes in the network. If so, then structuralist views in the philosophy of mathematics offer plau-
sible examples of symmetric essentialE grounding.39 Thus, REG doesn’t appear to be suited to
support the crucial asymmetry of creaturely participation in God, nor the core claim outlined in
DF that God is absolutely fundamental and metaphysically prior to creatures.
Second, as Kit Fine (1995: 274) and Katherin Koslicki (2013: 51-60) have argued, all forms of
existential grounding, whether modal or non-modal, are too weak in so far as they characterize
grounding solely in terms of what an entity requires for its existence. There certainly seems to be
more to the nature or essence of a thing than what that thing requires for its existence. Perhaps,
for instance, there’smore to the essence of a lion thanwhat a lionmodally requires for its existence
(think Aslan).
Somephilosophers, for instance, have argued that there are plausible caseswherex is essentiallyE
grounded in y, where nevertheless the identity of x fails to be grounded in the identity of y. Lowe
(2006: 199-200), for instance, has argued that “[v]ery plausibly, an entity can, for example, de-
pend essentially for its existence on one or more other entities, without necessarily depending
essentially for its identity upon those other entities.” Lowe points to an Aristotelian immanent
universal, roundness, as an example. As an immanent universal, roundness is such that it is part
of its essence that it exist only if some instance or other exists and is round; thus immanent uni-
versals are entities that are essentiallyE grounded in a more broad sense than REG. However,
the essence of the universal roundness—what it is fundamentally and which entity it is—does
not involve reference to any single round object nor to the totality of all actually existing round
objects.
Along similar lines, Fine (1995a: 274) presses the point further,
The present examples [viz. impossible objects and identity properties] highlight a
problem that besets any existential account of dependence, whether it be modal or
essentialist in form. For, it does not seem right to identify the ‘being’ of an object,
its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect, existence is too weak; for there
is more to what an object is than its mere existence. In another respect, existence is
39Barnes (2018). Although see Lowe (2012) for a critical discussion of alleged cases of symmetrical identity
grounding or dependence (see below) in structuralist ontologies.
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too strong; for what an object is, its nature, need not include existence as a part. 40
It would seem, then, that any form of existential grounding, whether modal or non-modal, is
ill-suited to capture the full range of ways in which creaturely natures are grounded in God, not
merely in terms of what such natures require for their existence. If so, then a neo-Aristotelian-
grounding framework for minimal participatory ontology may want to carve out an even more-
fine grained notion of essential grounding strictly in terms of what the thing requires for its
identity and not merely its existence.
3.3 Essential-Identity Grounding
For neo-Aristotelians like Lowe (2005) and Koslicki (2013), essentialist (non-modal) species of
grounding admit of further classification to include identity grounding, cases where the identity
of x and which thing of its kind x is are grounded in the identity of y and which thing of its
kind y is. Mark Johnston (2006: 676) captures this more robust connection between essence and
grounding nicely,
Associated with the ideas of real definition and essence is the idea of the ontological
dependence of one item on another; where an item x is ontologically dependent on
an item y just when y features at some point in the full account of the essence of x
(the real definition of x), but not vice versa.
In the same vein, Fine (2010:582) notes “One object may be (ontologically) prior to another in
the sense that it is possible to provide an explanation of the identity of the one object, to explain
what it is, with the help of the other object.”
Following Lowe (1998: 149) we can formulate this further species of essential grounding in
the following manner, call it “essentialI grounding:”
(IG) x is essentiallyI grounded in y =def there is a function ϕ such that□x(x=ϕ(y)).41
IG moves beyond purely existential grounding, whether modal (RG) or non-modal (REG), in
the sense that it specifies what is required not simply for x’s existence per se but what is required
for x’s identity, what x is and which thing of a certain kind x is. The set {Fido, Wilber}, for
example, is essentiallyI grounded in its members, Fido and Wilber, in that there is function, the
set-formation function, and it is part of the essence of {Fido, Wilber} that it be formed by Fido
and Wilber as its members; the identity of the set {Fido, Wilber}, what the set is and which set it
is, is grounded in its specific members.
Along with Lowe (2012), I take essentialI grounding to be a relation of individuation; if x
essentiallyI grounds y, then the individuality of y is fixed by the individuality of x, where x serves
as the individuator of y. Since sets are at least partially essentiallyI grounded in their members,
Fido andWilber individuate the set {Fido,Wilber}; which set {Fido,Wilber} is is fixed by Fido and
40As quoted in Koslicki (2013).
41I owe this formulation of Lowe’s account of essential-identity dependence to Koslicki (2013: 51).
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Wilber.42 Or, consider once again an ontology of events that construes events as a triple [o, P, t],
where ‘o’ stands for some object or objects, ‘P ’ a property (whether monadic or polyadic), and ‘t’
a time. If [o, P, t] is essentiallyI grounded in o, P , and t as its constituents, then the latter ground
not only the essence of [o, P, t] generally qua event, but also which individual event it is, say the
sinking of the Titanic (as opposed to the Battle of Hastings). Which event [o, P, t] is is fixed by
its essentialI grounds, its individual constituents.
As before, IG entails but is not entailed by the broader species of essential grounding in terms
of REG. If a set {Fido, Wilber} is essentiallyI grounded (IG) in its individual members Fido and
Wilber, then it is rigidly existentially (RG) as well as rigidly essentiallyE grounded (REG) in Fido
and Wilber as its members. Since IG moves beyond mere modal and non-modal existential
grounding, it is uniquely situated to account for the core tenet of CND, that each and every
aspect of creaturely essences are metaphysically grounded in God. Moreover, since IG entails
both forms of existential grounding, both modal (RG) and non-modal (REG), IG also secures
CED, that the existence of creatures is metaphysically grounded in God.
We are left with the question of whether this neo-Aristotelian conception of grounding in IG
secures the needed asymmetry at the heart of a minimal participatory ontology. As a species of
non-modal grounding, essentialI grounding moves beyond a view of grounding in purely exis-
tential terms (whether modal or non-modal) and arguably provides the requisite asymmetry we
are looking for when it comes to God’s supreme existential and essential priority over creatures.
While two entities may be mutually essentiallyE grounded in one another, this is arguably not
the case for essentialI grounding.43
As a strict partial ordering relation (G2-G4), IG is well-suited to carve out relations of meta-
physical priority and posteriority and support the notion of one concrete entity’s being more or
less fundamental than another. For instance, an event’s being metaphysically posterior to or less
fundamental than its constituents is understood in terms of the fact that the event is essentiallyI
grounded in its constituents, and not vice versa. Similarly, an occupant of spacetime is meta-
physically prior to its spatial boundary precisely because the former metaphysically fixes what
the boundary is in general, as well aswhich boundary it is in particular, and not vice versa. Lastly,
since tropes or modes are essentiallyI grounded in their bearers, the very identity of a mode—
what a redness trope of an apple is in general, as well aswhich redness trope it is in particular—are
grounded in the identity of its bearer and not vice versa. We could multiply examples.
The idea that all creatures, great and small, are essentiallyI grounded in God seems to en-
compass everything we want in a minimal participatory ontology. In virtue of being essentiallyI
grounded in God, the very existence (CED) and content of all creaturely natures (CND) is what
it is in virtue of being so grounded.
Let me at least attempt to offer a preliminary sketch of a more fine-grained theistic gloss on
how all creaturely natures are asymmetrically grounded in God (CND) along the lines of IG,
using the example of a particular lion named Rory. The complete essential profile of Rory the
42However, if one opts for TPG as stated in section 2.2 (for any existing entity x that is not identical to God, x is
partially grounded in God), God is also a partial ground of {Fido, Wilber}; in fact, on TPG, no existing entity that
is not identical to God has wholly non-theistic grounds.
43See Lowe (2012) for further defense of the asymmetry of essentialI grounding.
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lion—those leonine features that constitute the identity of a lion in general (its being living, mam-
malian, carnivorous, etc.) as well as Rory in particular (Rory being the very lion that she is)—are
all grounded in and resemble the rich plenitude of the divine nature as per divine exemplarism.
More specifically in terms of IG, suppose we take the primitive “creaturely resemblance to
God” function as a function (ϕ) from existing creatures to divine ideas of existing creatures, and
let “IR” stand for God’s idea of Rory the lion in particular (y), which includes all general leonine
features that are constitutive of the identity of a lion (living, mammalian, carnivorous, etc.) as
well as the particularity that is definitive of Rory as an individual instance of the general leonine
kind. On divine exemplarism, each and every existing creature resembles a particular intentional
aspect of the divine mind in precisely this way. Thus, Rory the lion is essentiallyI grounded in
IR along the lines of IG in so far as there is a function ϕ—“the creaturely resemblance to God”
function—such that it is part of the essence of Rory that she (and she alone) resembles God with
respect to IR in particular (y). Rory, we might say, is the unique creaturely expression of that
particular intentional aspect of the divine mind.44 Another way of saying this is that it is part of
the essence of Rory that she is the unique creaturely being she is in virtue of resembling IR, God’s
idea of Rory. It is not part of the essence of a distinct lion, say Leo the lion of MGM fame, that
it resemble God by way of IR, just as it is in no way part of the essence of the set {Fido, Wilber}
that it resemble God by way of God’s idea of the set {Larry, Moe, Curly}.
Since essentialI grounding is arguably a relation of individuation, not only is the general
essence of Rory (what it is to be a lion) essentiallyI grounded in IR, but so is Rory’s creaturely
particularity, which particular lion Rory is of the general leonine kind. God himself is (at the
very least) a partial essentialI ground for the existence and essence of each existing creature (as
per TPG in section 2.2). The asymmetry of IG here is crucial in the case of creaturely partici-
pation: Rory exists and is the way she is essentially—indeed is the very lion she is—ultimately
in virtue of the particularity and plenitude of God’s mental life, and not vice versa. Echoes of a
broadly similar conception of creaturely participation in God along the broad lines of IG can be
found throughout the Christian tradition. Recall once again Augustine’s previous remark that
all creaturely natures are “created in accord with the reasons unique to them,” reasons that “must
be thought to exist nowhere but in the very mind of the Creator.” Along the same lines, Aquinas
notes that “all creatures are nothing but a kind of real expression and representation of those
things which are comprehended in the conception of the divine Word.”45
In conclusion, I have tried to show how a distinctively neo-Aristotelian gloss onmetaphysical
grounding is best suited to provide the most promising ground-theoretic framework for a min-
imal participatory ontology along the lines of CEN, CND, and DF. The neo-Aristotelian move
from a modal (RG) to a non-modal species of grounding (REG), which assumes the irreducibil-
ity of essence to purely modal notions, provided the proper ontological framework to account
for the dependence of both the existence and essence of creatures on God (CND). Second, the
further neo-Aristotelian move from a mere essential-existential variety of grounding (one that
44For discussion of whether a view like this is compatible with a full-blooded doctrine of divine simplicity see
Pruss (2011: 274-276) and Ward (2020: 33-38).
45I owe this citation to Davison (2019:103). For a similar account see Ames (1968:95) and Anselm (2007: 40).
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limited essential grounding to what a thing requires for its existence by nature) to the notion of
essential-identity grounding (IG) provided a fuller conception of essential dependence as well
as the requisite asymmetry at the heart of a minimal participatory ontology; God alone is abso-
lutely metaphysically fundamental in that, for God, there is no distinct entity in which God is
essentiallyI grounded, and all non-God reality is essentiallyI grounded in Him.
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